

Experiencing Change: *Extensionalism, Retentionalism, and Marty's Hybrid Account*

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Something changes in virtue of having different, incompatible attributes at different times. How do we experience episodes of change? This is a central part of the larger question as to how we experience time. Anton Marty addresses this issue in his posthumously published book *Raum und Zeit* (1916). In this paper, I shall reconstruct Marty's position and relate it to contemporary work on our experience of change. In Sections 1 and 2, I shall introduce and criticize a typical extensionalist account and a typical retentionalist account of our experience of change. In Section 3, I shall present Marty's hybrid account as an original response to certain problems with the accounts of Sections 1 and 2. I shall close by raising three challenges for Marty's picture.

1 An extensionalist account

As a preliminary, I shall follow Marty and many others by adopting the common view that short episodes of change through time, such as the movement of a falling leaf or the frequency shift of a tone over the period of a second or less, can be experienced 'immediately'. In order to motivate this view, compare looking at a falling leaf and looking at a wilting leaf. It seems that in the case of the falling leaf we can see the leaf's movement just by looking at it, whereas we cannot just see the wilting leaf's change in shape and colour. What explains this contrast? A natural thought is that there is a maximal period of time that an individual experience can span, a Jamesian 'specious present' (James 1890), such that the leaf goes through a sequence of locational states that are different enough to be visually discriminable, and that fall within a specious present, whereas no visually discriminable differences in the leaf's shape and colour fall within a specious present, and hence its wilting fails to be visually perceivable (under normal circumstances). Instead, the wilting of the leaf is inferred on the basis of memories of past leaf-states of shape and colour.¹

How do we experience episodes of change (in the scope of a specious present)? In order to set the stage for my reconstruction and discussion of Marty's view, let me sketch an *extensionalist* account that is fairly common in the contemporary debate about the issue. The account rests on the metaphysical *block-universe-theory of time*, according to the simplest version of which time is a one-

¹ See, *inter alia*, Broad (1923: 351).

dimensional structure of moments that stand in an absolute relation of temporal priority. In the block universe, all moments of time are equally real—i.e., none of them is metaphysically privileged over the others. In this framework, an episode of change in the material world is standardly understood as a temporal sequence of incompatible states of the same material object. The movement of a leaf is thus understood as a temporal sequence of incompatible locational states of the same leaf, none of which is metaphysically privileged.

Suppose that a leaf moves from location l_1 to l_2 to l_3 across moments t_1 , t_2 , and t_3 . Suppose, moreover, that I experience this particular episode of change, a diachronic succession of leaf-states, ‘immediately’. How do I manage to experience such a succession? According to *extensionalism*, the explanation of the experiential representation of succession rests on the assumption that my token experience is itself temporally extended through the interval from t_1 to t_3 , and that it has temporal parts at t_1 , t_2 , and t_3 , that correspond to the temporal parts of the leaf’s movement.² How the explanation proceeds from here is a matter of debate within the extensionalist camp. One approach is to hold that the temporally extended token experience represents the different states of the leaf as having a certain temporal order R, because the temporal parts of the diachronic token experience themselves have temporal order R. Another approach is to hold that the temporally extended experience just represents the movement of the leaf, and that the token experience has temporal parts with temporal order R, where these temporal parts represent temporal parts of the movement, because the movement of the leaf has temporal parts with order R. Whichever the direction of dependence, the relations of temporal priority holding among the temporal parts of the diachronic experience typically match the relations of temporal priority holding among the represented leaf-states, as illustrated in Figure 1, where p_1 – p_3 are momentary perceptual states whose cross-temporal sum is an ordinary experience of a contemporaneous movement of a leaf.




Figure 1

² Extensionalism’s main defenders are Dainton (2006), Foster (1991), and Phillips (2014).

This is an account of the contents of experiences of change in the scope of a specious present. How can the account be extended to address not only individual experiences of change during a specious present but also connected experiences constituting a continuous stream of consciousness over longer periods? Suppose that a leaf moves from location l_1 to l_2 , ... to l_n , in thirty seconds. While this episode is too long to be immediately experienced as a whole, I experientially track the whole movement, representing the locational transition of the leaf from each l_i to l_{i+1} . How do my immediate experiences of the leaf's movements during various specious presents connect to yield a stream of consciousness that tracks the leaf's whole movement? A simple response is that my stream of consciousness is the sequence of my immediate experiences of the leaf's movements during various 'adjacent' specious presents, where the first experience in the sequence represents the leaf's movement from l_1 to l_2 (as in Figure 1), the second experience in the sequence represents the leaf's movement from l_2 to l_3 , and so on. This response is unsatisfactory, however, since I end up having no immediate experience of the leaf's transition from l_2 to l_3 , contrary to our assumption. So my immediate experiences must be connected in such a way that all transitions in the leaf's movement are represented. This may be achieved by letting the contents of the immediate experiences making up the stream of consciousness 'overlap', such that the first experience in the sequence represents the leaf's movement from l_1 to l_2 , the second experience in the sequence represents the leaf's movement from l_2 to l_3 , and so on. Extensionalists can implement this response elegantly by allowing the immediate, temporally extended token experiences in the stream of consciousness to overlap by sharing temporal parts, in a way that matches the overlap of the represented segments of the leaf's movement. While the experiential tracking of longer episodes of change raises further philosophical challenges, I shall leave this issue here, since my discussion will focus on experiences of change during a specious present.³

Let us now turn to the phenomenal character of such experiences. In order to focus the discussion, I shall assume representationalism, according to which phenomenal aspects of mental states are grounded in (or are identical with) representational aspects—*aspects of the contents*—of these mental states. Given representationalism, extensionalists face the following question: Can the extensionalist content of our experience of the leaf's movement explain the experience's phenomenal character? That is, can the content explain how experiencing the movement feels to us? It is hard to see how such an explanation could go. According to extensionalism, we experience the leaf's movement as having the shape of a four-dimensional spacetime-worm reminiscent of a comic-strip. *Prima facie*, this shape is miles from how an experience of a moving leaf normally feels like to us. Something seems to be missing from this picture.

One aspect of our experience of change that seems to be missing is the following. While we seem to experience several three-dimensional locational leaf-states together, these different states do not all seem *real*. At most one leaf-state seems real. Moreover, which leaf-state appears real seems to change. We seem to

³ The issue of how experiences of change in the scope of a specious present are connected to yield a stream of consciousness is discussed in detail in Dainton (2006).

experience one leaf-state after the other entering and leaving reality. What seems real never includes non-simultaneous states. Experienced reality never becomes temporally extended, four-dimensional. Reality rather remains temporally unextended, yet in constant flux, with one leaf-state in the bounds of reality being replaced by another, and that one by another, and so on. Such constant replacement seems integral to the sense of *temporal flow*, the sense of *whoosh*, in the experience of change.

While the sketched extensionalist picture captures our experience of the occurrence and temporal order of multiple locational leaf-states, it misses the apparent differences concerning the states' reality-status. What makes our experiences of change feel that way?

2 A retentionalist account

Many philosophers have thought that an adequate explanation of our experience of change, which includes the sense of differences in reality-status, requires as its basis a different metaphysical picture of time. Friends of 'dynamic' theories of time—flow-lovers, for short—have traditionally viewed their accounts of the nature of time as providing ideal foundations for explaining the phenomenal character of our experiences of change. They have argued that, unlike block-lovers—friends of the block-universe-theory of time—they can give a simple explanation. According to flow-lovers, we seem to experience a change in reality when we experience a change in objects, because our experience represents the change in objects as involving a change concerning the reality of the experienced object-states. And the experience represents the objectual change in this way, because the objectual change in fact involves a difference and change concerning what is real. This approach looks simple and elegant. But it raises two obvious questions. What does a difference and change concerning what is real consist in? And how do we experience this sort of difference and change?

One starting point is to recognize a metaphysically robust notion of *the present*, or *presentness*, and to think of object-change, such as the movement of our leaf, along the following lines. The present undergoes a change in which three-dimensional states of our leaf it contains. The present currently contains the leaf's l_3 -state, say, but the present used to contain the leaf's l_2 -state instead, and even longer ago the present contained the leaf's l_1 -state. When the leaf undergoes locational change, then one three-dimensional locational state contained in the present is replaced by a different three-dimensional locational state as the present changes. I shall call this the *replacement model* of change. Flow-lovers may welcome the replacement model, while block-lovers must reject it, since they do not recognize a metaphysically robust present.

Intuitively, the replacement model of change seems to correspond to what our experiences of change feel like. We do not seem to experience undifferentiated four-dimensional episodes of change in objects. We rather seem to experience successions of three-dimensional object-states, where each state is immediately replaced by another one. Given the replacement model of change, the experienced difference

and change in what is real may be understood as change concerning which object-state is present.

The replacement model of change may be based on different flow-loving metaphysical pictures of time. The usual suspects are presentism, the moving-spotlight theory, and the growing-block theory. All three views may be portrayed as saying that when our leaf undergoes locational change, then one three-dimensional locational state contained in the present is replaced by a different three-dimensional locational state as the present changes. According to presentism, very roughly, each locational leaf-state comes into existence as it enters the present and goes out of existence as it leaves the present, since only presently obtaining states exist. Thus, different states of the leaf do not ‘add up’ to yield a four-dimensional sequence, and there are no states that stand in the absolute earlier-than relation or the absolute later-than relation to present states, as is the case in the block universe. According to the growing-block view, by contrast, each locational leaf-state comes into existence as it enters the present but remains in existence as it leaves the present. Thus, different states of the leaf add up over time to yield a four-dimensional sequence—the sequence ‘grows’—such that past states stand in the earlier-than relation to present states. Finally, according to the moving-spotlight view, no leaf-state comes into or goes out of existence as it enters or leaves the present, since all leaf-states exist absolutely, composing a four-dimensional sequence of states atemporally. The non-existential change with respect to which of these locational states is present may be compared to a change with respect to which of a sequence of objects is illuminated by a spotlight. The formulation of these views raise many questions that cannot be addressed here. So let us move on.

Can we experience a change concerning which object-state is present, in the flow-lover’s robust sense of ‘present’? On the face of it, we cannot. For the flow-lover’s fundamental property of presentness does not seem to be a property that is fit to be represented in immediate experience along with an object’s shapes and colours, as Brentano and Marty, among others, have pointed out. Likewise for the property of pastness.

The good news, though, is that there is another way for the difference between presentness and pastness to become manifest in experience. According to the view that is now typically called *retentionalism*, we can distinguish between a present-directed experiential state, which I shall call a *perception*, and a past-directed experiential state, which Husserl called a *retention*. Husserl got the idea from Brentano, who called retentions *proteraestheses*. I shall stick with the now-common Husserlian term.⁴ Brentano, in his later period, thought that perceptions and retentions are individuated by different *temporal modes of presentation* (*Vorstellung*). We may think of perceiving an object-state as experiencing-*present* the state, and we may think of retaining an object-state as experiencing-*past* the state. Brentano also thought that there are different degrees of retaining a state, so that a subject can retain a state more or less strongly.

Suppose that in our leaf-case a subject S perceives (in my strict sense of the term) the leaf’s l_3 -state, which is the state currently contained in the present.

⁴ See Brentano (1988) and Husserl (1991).

Moreover, S retains the leaf's l_2 -state to a high degree, which is a state that was contained in the present in the most recent past. Moreover, S retains the leaf's l_1 -state to a slightly lower degree, which is a state that was contained in the present a tiny bit longer ago. It is important that each of these experiential states represents a leaf-state without representing presentness or pastness of the state, and without representing any temporal relations between the leaf-state and any other object-states. S's perception and retentions are illustrated in Figure 2. For ease of illustration, the different 'versions' of the present to which S's three intentional states, namely perception p and retentions r_1 and r_2 , 'reach out' are depicted in a single diagram.




Figure 2

The psychological difference between perception and retention corresponds to the worldly difference between presentness and pastness. While presentness and pastness are not represented in experience, they nevertheless make their mark in experience through these modes of presentation. But how does this difference rise to consciousness, given that temporal modes are mere ways of representing? Brentano's answer, as I understand it, is that the past-present divide becomes conscious through the subject's awareness of being in a state of perception and in a state of retention, which awareness accompanies each such state. In our case, S is currently aware that she is perceiving the leaf's l_3 -state, S is aware that she is retaining to degree n the l_2 -state, and S is aware that she is retaining to degree n^* the l_1 -state, where n^* is lower than n . Furthermore, S's current states of awareness are phenomenally unified, which allows S experientially to 'compare' her perception and her retentions, and hence to be aware of their differences. Through a subject's awareness of differences in temporal mode of presentation those differences become conscious.

As pointed out at the beginning, when we experience episodes of change, such as the leaf's movement, we seem to experience a succession involving a difference concerning which object-state is real: when several, non-simultaneous object-states are experienced, only one of them feels real, whereas the others do not. On the sketched retentionalist model, neither the differences in reality-status between, nor the temporal order among, leaf-states are represented by the content of the

experience. What these phenomenal aspects consist in are aspects of the awareness of perceptions and retentions. What makes me say, intuitively, that in experiencing change one object-state feels real, while another one does not, is that I am aware of perceiving the first state, while I am aware of retaining the second. And what makes me say, intuitively, that the experienced object-states are temporally ordered, is that I am aware of the differences in type and degree of temporal modes of presentation involved in the experience of change, which differences give rise to a unique order.

This picture aims to explain more aspects of our experiences of change than the simple extensionalist model of Section 1. While the latter only captures the experienced temporal order among object-states, the retentionalist model outlined here also captures the experienced differences in reality-status between object-states. It should, furthermore, be indicated briefly how the retentionalist account may be extended to yield a basic picture of how immediate experiences of change in the scope of a specious present connect to yield a stream of consciousness over a longer period of time. Suppose, again, that a leaf moves from location l_1 to l_2 , ... to l_n in thirty seconds, and that while I lack an immediate experience of the movement as a whole, I track the whole movement experientially, representing the locational transition of the leaf from each l_i to l_{i+1} . As we saw in Section 1, one challenge of this case (among others) is that my immediate experiences must be connected in such a way that all transitions in the leaf's movement are represented. This may be achieved by letting the contents of the immediate experiences making up the stream of consciousness 'overlap'. In the retentionalist framework sketched above, this desideratum may be satisfied by letting S's perception of the leaf's l_3 -state and S's simultaneous retentions of the leaf's l_2 -state and of its l_1 -state (as illustrated in Figure 2) be immediately followed by S's perception of the leaf's l_4 -state and S's simultaneous retentions of the leaf's l_3 -state and of its l_2 -state, and so on. As a result, the subject does not miss any locational transition in the leaf's movement from l_1 to l_n .

Is the retentionalist approach plausible? One might object that it is implausible to move all temporal aspects of an experience of change from the content of a first-order experience to the content of a higher-order awareness of the temporal modes involved in the first-order experience. Many contemporary philosophers share the view that our temporal experience is 'transparent' at least to the extent that we represent things in the world—objects, object-states, property-instances, or the like—as being ordered by temporal priority. The sense of temporal priority comes from first-order content; worldly temporal order is experienced 'directly'. Marty expresses this view when he says:

Direct experience alone seems to show me that we have an intuition (*Anschauung*) of such non-modal temporal differences. (1916: 209)

The Brentanian retentionalist lacks the resources to capture this common transparency intuition.

Furthermore, Marty complains about Brentanian retentionalism that retention is taken to come in degrees (1916: 208). In experiencing a leaf's motion over a second, say, we seem to experience a continuum of different leaf-states. In order to capture this impression, the retentionalist must admit indefinitely many different

retentional states of the subject of experience, which are individuated by different degrees of retention. Marty, among others, finds it hard to accept that our experiences of change involve this sort of mental complexity.

The extensionalist of Section 1 seems to be in a better position than the Brentanian retentionalist to capture our impression of temporal order, because the extensionalist simply takes such order to be represented in first-order experience. As we saw, however, the extensionalist lacks the resources to capture our impressions of differences in reality-status among object-states, whereas the retentionalist can explain these differences by recourse to temporal modes of presentation. Might there be a position that combines these two explanatory strengths?

3 Marty's hybrid account

The heart of Marty's own account of our experiences of change is to combine an extensionalist element with a retentionalist element into a hybrid account. I take Marty to develop his account in a presentist framework, since he states, at the beginning of his considerations on temporal experience in *Raum und Zeit*:

Only the present is actual (*wirklich*) in the proper and relevant sense, while the past and the future is not (1916: 197).⁵

Let me begin with his extensionalist element. Marty holds that when we immediately or intuitively (*anschaulich*) experience change a temporal sequence of object-states, within the scope of a specious present, is represented as temporally ordered in the experience. He does not consider or take seriously the option of allowing a temporally extended token experience to do the job of representing a temporally extended sequence. So he claims that a momentary, temporally unextended, experiential state represents a sequence of object-states as temporally ordered, which sequence includes object-states having occurred before the experiential state itself. Applied to our case, a momentary experience of subject S represents the leaf's l_1 -state, its l_2 -state, and its l_3 -state, as well as the earlier-than relation holding between these states, as illustrated in Figure 3. (As in Figure 2, different 'versions' of the present are depicted in a single diagram.)

⁵ As Simons (1990) points out, Marty's notion of being actual (*wirklich*, *aktuell*) is different from his notion of being real, by which he means being causally efficient (*wirkungsfähig*). The present, for him, is actual but not real.




Figure 3

Marty's approach is extensionalist, in so far as he allows the content of an experience of change to represent a temporally extended sequence of object-states. He does not, however, join the straightforward extensionalists of Section 1, because he denies that the token experience itself has a temporal extension that matches the extension of the sequence it represents. Instead, the token state itself is, according to Marty, temporally unextended.⁶

Marty does not stop here. For he realizes that there is more to the experience of change than the representation of a sequence of object-states and its temporal order. As I put it earlier, the different states experienced do not all feel real. As he puts it, the states do not all feel actual, or factual (*aktuell, tatsächlich*). There is a phenomenal aspect that still needs to be accounted for. In response, Marty incorporates a retentionalist element into his picture.

Marty is convinced, following Brentano, that we must distinguish between different psychological attitudes to what is presented in an immediate experience of change. In contrast to Brentano's later view, however, he holds that an experience of change involves different temporal qualities, or forms, of the *mode of judgment* without also involving different temporal modes of presentation. (For Brentano temporal modes of judgment are derived from temporal modes of presentation.) Given that for Marty the temporal horizon of a presentation is extended, presenting a plurality of object-states, such a presentation cannot be partly individuated by a specific temporal mode of presenting a momentary object-state, in the way Brentano advocates. As regards the mode of judgment, Marty admits two temporal forms of this mode, in addition to its positive form (accepting) and its negative form (rejecting). Judgments thus come in three forms: *accepting-present*, *accepting-past*, and *rejecting*.⁷ The present-directed form of judgment and the past-directed form accompany each of our immediate presentations of temporally extended sequences

⁶ This is, in essence, the view of experiencing change put forth by C. D. Broad in his (1923).

⁷ Cf. Simons (1990: 167).

of object-states. As Marty is sceptical about the idea that retentions come in degrees, he does not admit different degrees of judging in the past-directed form. Nor does he admit a future-directed form of judging. Marty summarizes the two components he finds in an experience of change as follows:

The intuition (*Anschauung*) of constancy and change involves:

1. that a continuum of temporal positions and their fillers is presented to us;
- and 2. that a judging consciousness is connected with the presentation of each of those positions and their fillers, which currently judges the presented as present and then, for a while, as past. (1916: 210)

In the leaf case, subject S has a presentation of three temporally ordered leaf-states. About these different leaf-states S makes mental judgments in different temporal forms. S mentally judges in the present-directed form—that is, S accepts-present—that the leaf is in l_3 . As regards the leaf's l_1 -state and its l_2 -state, Marty holds that S mentally judges in the past-directed form—that is, S accepts-past—that the leaf is in l_1 and l_2 . Notice that he does not hold that S makes distinct past-directed judgments, one concerning the leaf's l_1 -state and one concerning the leaf's l_2 -state. He rather holds that one past-directed judgment spans a whole manifold of past states (1916: 211). Marty's take on S's judgments in the leaf case is illustrated in Figure 4, where j_1 and j_2 are a present-directed and a past-directed mental judgment, respectively.




Figure 4

As on the retentionalist account of Section 2, a present-directed mental judgment does not represent an object-state as being present. Nor does a past-directed mental judgment represent an object-state as being past. A subject is aware of judging-present an object-state while making this mental judgment, and she is aware of judging-past an object-state while making that mental judgment, and she is aware of the difference in temporal form of judgment when she is judging-present

and judging-past. These moves put Marty in the position to explain that S has the sense that the leaf's l_3 -state is *actual*, whereas she has the sense that the leaf's l_2 -state and its l_1 -state are both *non-actual*. The difference consists in S's awareness of judging-present that the leaf's l_3 -state obtains, and S's awareness of judging-past that the leaf's l_2 -state and its l_1 -state obtain.

By combining an extensionalist element with a retentionalist element Marty can offer an account of our immediate experience of change, in which both the impression of temporal order and the impression of differences in reality-status, or, using his term, in actuality-status, among experienced object-states are captured. The impression of temporal order is grounded in an aspect of experiential content, whereas the impression of differences in reality/actuality comes from the awareness of differences in temporal forms of judgment.⁸

Marty's hybrid view is original and deserves more discussion in the literature on temporal experience than it has received so far. I presented it in a way that is meant to highlight its advantages over the simple extensionalist view of Section 1 and the Brentanian retentionalist view of Section 2. In contrast to simple extensionalism, the hybrid view captures the impression of differences in reality-status—that is, the impression of a robust past-present divide—in addition to the impression of temporal order. In contrast to Brentanian retentionalism, the hybrid view captures the impression of temporal order by respecting the common intuition of transparency—that is, the intuition that we represent temporal order as occurring out there in the world—and without massively inflating the complexity of temporal modes of presentation by admitting degrees of retention.

I shall close by pointing to three challenges for Marty's account. First, Marty does not offer much by way of resolving the mystery of how an experience manages to represent a temporally extended sequence of object-states. He just takes for granted that a present experience can represent a chunk of the past in addition to the present. Contemporary extensionalists claim to offer the most straightforward account of the representation of temporally extended sequences by holding that token experiences are themselves temporally extended and represent an extended sequence in the world *atemporally*. The experiences just 'mirror' the world. (In Section 1, I distinguished two implementations of this explanatory strategy.) On Marty's account, however, a token experience is supposed to represent, *at a moment*, a temporally non-momentary sequence of object-states. This seems to be a way of seeing (not remembering, and not retaining) the past from the present. Many find this sort of representational power mysterious.

Second, while Marty adopts presentism and presumably expects our experiences as of change to represent episodes of change veridically, an experiential

⁸ According to Brentano, it would be implausible to hold that all of our time consciousness requires temporal forms of judgment. For we may simply think about states in the past or in the future without accepting or rejecting them, thereby taking a non-judgmental intentional attitude towards them. Likewise for various other intentional attitudes, including emotional ones. In response to Brentano's worry, Marty admits a mediate type of time consciousness in addition to the immediate type that is involved in our experiences of change (1916: 214ff). Since his account of mediate time consciousness remains fragmentary, and since the focus of my discussion is on immediate time consciousness, I shall not address the nature of the mediate form here. See Simons (1990: Section 4.3) for a reconstruction.

representation of a sequence of object-states as ordered by temporal priority cannot be veridical in a typical presentist world. The reason is that in such a world no states stand in an absolute relation of temporal priority. There are no object-states or objects or any other things earlier than or later than the present. This is the key assumption of the view. While there were other object-states and other things, as ‘contents’ of the present as it used to be, none of these states or things are earlier than the present, in the sense of ‘earlier-than’ that Marty has in mind. So our experiences of change, as Marty construes them, are all illusory, if presentism is true. Most friends of ‘dynamic’ theories of time, however, wish to avoid the apparent consequence of ‘static’ theories that we are stuck with systematically illusory temporal experiences.

Flow-lovers impressed with the explanatory potential of Marty’s hybrid view might consider cutting its presentist roots and reconstructing it within a different flow-friendly metaphysical framework instead. According to Marty, a present experiential state represents a sequence of object-states that reaches into the past. Since both the growing-block view and the moving-spotlight view accept the existence of past object-states, Marty’s presently obtaining, past-directed experiential states representing object-states as ordered by temporal priority might have a chance of being veridical in these frameworks.

Third, while Marty’s account goes further than the other accounts reviewed here in explaining how we experience change, it shares with the others the significant defect of omitting the most difficult aspect of experiencing change, namely, the *sense of flow*, as I call it. Recall my initial phenomenological description of experiencing the movement of a leaf (Section 1). It seems that we experience the replacement of one three-dimensional locational state of the leaf by another locational state, and the latter by another one, and so on, such that one leaf-state after the other enters and leaves reality. When experiencing the occurrence of a plurality of leaf-states, we seem to experience a change in which of these states is real. What Marty’s hybrid account gives us is an experience of a temporal sequence of states, such that one state in the sequence feels real, or actual, and the others feel unreal, or non-actual. The source of this phenomenal difference concerning reality/actuality-status is Marty’s distinction between two temporal forms of judgment. But the hybrid account does not yet tell us how we get to experience a *change* concerning which state feels real, or actual, and which states do not.

One might attempt the following response on behalf of Marty. Suppose that at one time, S has a momentary experience that represents that the leaf’s l_1 -state obtains before the leaf’s l_2 -state, and that the leaf’s l_2 -state obtains before the leaf’s l_3 -state. Moreover, at this time, S accepts-present that the leaf’s l_3 -state obtains, while accepting-past that the leaf’s l_1 -state and its l_2 -state obtain. Suppose, further, that a moment later, S has an experience that represents that the leaf’s l_2 -state obtains before the leaf’s l_3 -state obtains, and that the leaf’s l_3 -state obtains before the leaf’s l_4 -state obtains. Moreover, S now accepts-present that the leaf’s l_4 -state obtains, while accepting-past that the leaf’s l_2 -state and its l_3 -state obtains. In this example, different leaf-states feel real/actual to S at different times. At one time, S has an experience of a sequence of object-states, where one state feels real/actual and the others do not, and at a later time, S has a different experience of almost the same sequence of object-states, where a different state feels real/actual and the others do not. This is a

Marty-style account of how different immediate experiences of change, each in the scope of a specious present, connect to yield a stream of consciousness over a longer period of time. While the picture involves a change in which object-state feels real/actual, it is insufficient to explain how we immediately *experience* the actuality/reality flux. The subject may have one experience of a sequence where one state feels real/actual, and she may remember (in the standard episodic sense) that she had an experience a moment ago where a different state felt real/actual, and then she may infer that a change has occurred in which state feels real/actual. But this is not a model of experiencing a change in reality/actuality of the sort required by a phenomenally adequate account of temporal experience.⁹

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